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There has much debate about the extent to which professional discretion has been challenged by recent
organisational changes such as through the new forms of governance associated with the introduction of
the principles of the New Public Management (NPM) into health systems and other public sector ser-
vices. What appears to be missing from these debates is a detailed analysis of the concept of professional
discretion itself. This paper attempts to ﬁll this gap by delineating the key concepts of professional
discretion evident in the literature and exploring their signiﬁcance in an empirical study of the inﬂuence
of the 2004 new general medical services contract (nGMS) and the introduction of the Quality and
Outcomes Framework (QOF), a prescriptive pay-for-performance system designed to standardise the
quality of care provision in general medical practice in the United Kingdom. The study adopted a lon-
gitudinal design using semi-structured interviews with general practitioners (GPs, N ¼ 62) working in
the English National Health Service (NHS) between 2007 and 2009. A multi-dimensional conception of
discretion was used to explore how GP discretion might have been inﬂuenced by contractual changes
and in particular, QOF. The ﬁndings suggest that through a complex interplay of factors, a post-QOF
reduction in GP discretion was identiﬁable, highlighting different potential sources of constraint such
as in the social, organisational and economic dimensions of discretion. The evidence also suggested the
emergence of a new form of organisational medical professionalism within general practice charac-
terised by standardisation, bureaucracy and performance management.
 2013 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. Open access under CC BY license.Introduction
There has much debate about the extent to which professional
discretion has been curtailed by recent organisational changes
through the new forms of governance associated with the principles
of new public management (NPM) and related policies such as the
introduction of performance targets, audit andmonitoring intohealth
systems and other public sector services (Calnan&Gabe, 2009). There
are those theorists thatarguethat theseandotherpolicychangeshave
resulted in a decline in medical professional power and highlight the
threats generated through the impact of processes such as proletar-
ianisation, corporatisation, bureaucratisation and commodiﬁcationter.ac.uk (S. Cheraghi-Sohi),
r Ltd. Open access under CC BY licensee.g. (Coburn, Rappolt & Bourgeault, 1997; Haug, 1973). In contrast,
Freidson’s (1994) theory of professional restratiﬁcation offers a
different perspective as it suggests that the medical profession has
taken a more active stance and retained its power, despite external
pressures forcontrol.Heargued that regulatorychanges, at least in the
United States, have transformed some doctors into ‘administrative
elites’ and ‘knowledge elites’ who have distinctly different roles and
duties from ‘rank and ﬁle’ colleagues. This approach has been sup-
ported by Harrison (2009), who suggests that the normalisation of
new ﬁnancial incentive schemes e like the Quality and Outcomes
Framework (QOF) inprimarycare inEngland -may lead to amedically
qualiﬁed ‘administrative elite’ (Harrison 2009). Some theorists sug-
gest that this stratiﬁcation or fragmentation in medicine is a result of
the emergence of a new form of professionalism which might be
characterised by an increasing mediating role for clinicians and
acceptance of organisational, managerial and market values. For
example, more recently Freidson (2001) has argued that profession-
alism might be portrayed in terms of a third logic, or ideal type of
the organisation of work, where the professional acts as a mediator,
managing the interests and pressures of the state or other corporate.
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tients. The beneﬁts of such a role, according to Freidson (2001), are to
encourage trust andconﬁdence inpublic services and reduce the costs
of governmental action and control. Kuhlmann (2008) also argues
that there is increasing evidence of new forms of professionalism
emerging at themicro-levelwhich are distinctly different fromearlier
forms as professionalism becomes more diverse and context depen-
dent. Examples of this are: the emergence of a new type of general
practitioner (GP), conceptualised as ‘street-level bureaucrats’, who
mediatebetweenexternal, bureaucratic pressures toadhere to clinical
guidelines and the professional practice of everyday patient care
based on experiential, individualised knowledge (Checkland, 2004)
and ‘public service entrepreneurs’whoadopt thevalues of themarket
tomeet the needs of the patients but are not driven by a proﬁtmotive
(Boyce, 2008).
In contrast, there are those who have suggested that the in-
ﬂuence of these organisational changes on the medical profes-
sion, manifested in new forms of governance and accountability,
have been over stated. For example it has been suggested that
the concept of ‘new professionalism’ is too simplistic since there
are aspects of continuity as well as of change within the medical
profession (Evetts, 2011). It has been argued that the contem-
porary workplace has placed increased pressure on professionals
to be ﬂexible and construct multiple occupational identities such
as where GPs have maintained, negotiated, or reinvented their
professional identities as both ‘professional’ and ‘business owner’
(Huby et al. 2008; McDonald, Harrison, & Checkland, 2008). In
contrast, other writers characterise professionalism in a more
traditional terms, as having a signiﬁcant degree of autonomy over
their work which enables the medical profession to resist any
enforced change and use it to enhance their social position
(Timmermans & Kolker, 2004).
Timmermans (2008), however, suggests that it has been very
difﬁcult to judge, at least at the empirical level, whether medical
professional power has been maintained or not. Certainly, this
conclusion seems to be reﬂected in the inconsistency in empirical
evidence. For example, a recent study in England showed a lack
of use and acceptance of NICE guidelines (arguably a form of
clinical governance) which reﬂected the profession’s traditional
concerns about the importance of clinical freedom and discretion
(Spyridonidis & Calnan, 2011). Both GPs and hospital doctors’
adopted strategies to avoid top-down modes of control such as
NICE guidelines; which they perceived as unacceptable re-
strictions on their professional right of clinical judgement and
self-regulation. Yet, other evidence from studies in primary care
suggests an increasing acceptance of the need for professional
scrutiny and accountability amongst the rank and ﬁle (McDonald,
Checkland & Harrison, 2009; McDonald, Checkland, Harrison &
Coleman, 2009). This apparent inconsistency in ﬁndings might
reﬂect the differential impact of these external pressures on
different aspects of professional discretion. Despite a great deal
of attention given to the concept of professional discretion, there
appears to be a lack of discussion, conceptualisation and analysis
regarding the concept itself. A closer examination of the concept
is therefore warranted. The result of such an exercise should
enable a more precise identiﬁcation of the nature and extent of
any changes in professional discretion. In the ﬁrst of ﬁve sections,
descriptions, deﬁnitions and dimensions of discretion in relation
to professional work are discussed. In the second, the empirical
context in which we investigate the extent and nature of any
perceived changes in aspects of professional discretion is out-
lined. Details on methods are presented in section three, fol-
lowed by ﬁndings in section four. The ﬁnal section discusses the
implications of these ﬁndings and offers some concluding
comments.Conceptualising discretion: the importance of context
The basic premise underlying the notion of discretion is free-
dom. Inextricably bound to the notion of freedom is one of
constraint, in as much as there are countervailing factors which
ostensibly act to constrain freedom. Some of the earliest discus-
sions regarding the nature of discretion, originated within the legal
arena. Ronald Dworkin’s (1977) description highlights the relative
nature of the concept: “discretion, like the hole in a doughnut, does
not exist except for an area left open by a surrounding belt of re-
striction ”(Dworkin, 1977, p. 31). Dworkin also distinguished be-
tween two different forms of discretion; weak and strong. Weak,
referring to the need for ofﬁcials to exercise judgement, as rules
cannot simply be applied mechanistically. The proliferation and
implementation of rule structures across public administration
associated with the advent of NPMwould suggest that the notion of
weak discretion remains salient in any contemporary discussion of
professional discretion. Strong discretion on the other hand leaves
both the decision making and the criteria of decision making to
ofﬁcials, and is the type exerted by medical professionals working
in ‘professional bureaucracies’ (Mintzberg, Quinn & Ghoshal, 1998)
characteristic of much of the history of the UK’s National Health
Service.
Despite the concept of discretion receiving attention and ex-
tended discussion in other areas of professional work, analysts did
not appear to consider it in relation to the professional group who
have received most attention within the sociological literature, the
medical profession. One of the most popular sociological narratives
of medical professionalism has focused on ’professional domi-
nance’ theories which have been underpinned by the concept of
professional autonomy (Freidson 1970). Evetts (2002) sought to
build upon Freidson’s conceptualisation of autonomy by utilising an
alternative term, professional discretion, which she sees as more
reﬂective of modern professional organisational contexts. Specif-
ically she states:
Professional discretion enables workers to assess and evaluate
cases and conditions, and to assert their professional judgement
regarding advice, performance and treatment. To exercise
discretion, however, requires the professional to make decisions
and recommendations that take all factors and requirements
into account. These factors and requirements will include or-
ganizational, economic, social, political and bureaucratic con-
ditions and constraints. Thus, professional decisions will not be
based solely on the needs of individual clients, but on clients’
needs in the wider corporate, organizational and economic
context.
Evetts, 2002, p. 345.
As yet however, Evett’s deﬁnition of discretion and a focus on
the different comprising elements and their inﬂuence on the ex-
ercise of professional discretion, has not been operationalised for
analytical purposes. This paper aims to ﬁll this gap, by utilising
Evett’s deﬁnition in relation to an empirical study. We focus on the
different comprising elements of professional discretion and their
inﬂuence on the exercise of that discretion. The multi-dimensional
approach will examine the areas and extent to which medical
professional discretion, speciﬁcally GP discretion, has been
perceived to have been affected by recent health service policy
changes.UK general practice: a shift towards contractual governance
GP principals are ‘independent contractors’ to the NHS. Conse-
quently, GPs had for long periods of the NHS been ‘untouched’ by
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cost (e.g. due to their role as coordinators and gatekeepers for
specialist care) and quality of care led to general practice becoming
a focal point for the attentions of central policy makers who seek to
control aspects of frontline professional practice. Accordingly,
policy makers turned to their main tool, the contract. Contracts
have become increasingly more prescriptive over-time and in 2004
almost 80 per cent of GPs who voted were in favour (Walton, 2005)
of what is undoubtedly the most prescriptive version to date, the
new General Medical Services contract (nGMS). The nGMS allowed
GPs to opt-out of their 24 h responsibility for patient care but also
came with a prescriptive, but optional, pay-for-performance
scheme in the form of the Quality and Outcomes Framework (QOF).
The initial 2004 version of the QOF comprised 146 indicators
covering a range of clinical and non-clinical domains. Each indi-
cator is worth a number of ‘points’ and achieving full points con-
tributes a sizeable (approximately 20%) proportion of practice
income. Payments rely on accurate data collection and part of the
contract provided monies to practices in order to update the
available Information and Communication Technology (ICT) to
allow for this to occur. In addition, there were also signiﬁcant
changes to the legal basis resulting in the overall responsibility of
caring for an individual patient lying with the practice. As a result of
these combined changes and particularly in response to the QOF,
one commentator proclaimed the nGMS “an unprecedented system
of central control and external surveillance” (Jeffries, 2003, p. 888).
Practices scored highly on QOF, exceeding the UK government’s
expectations and they received much higher than expected bonus
payments (Cole, 2005). High QOF achievement has seemingly been
achieved through various mechanisms. First, ICTchanges mean that
reminders in the form of ‘pop-up’ boxes containing standardised
data entry templates immediately spring up per consultation
(designed to direct practitioner attention) which request relevant
patient information. QOF payments are made based on the sub-
mitted information collected via such templates (Checkland,
McDonald & Harrison, 2007). Secondly, GPs have seemingly dele-
gated much of the QOF template work to their practice nurses
working in disease speciﬁc ‘QOF clinics’ (Grant et al. 2009). Thirdly,
practices appear to have formed internal ‘QOF teams’, who are
charged with monitoring and ‘chasing’ their colleagues in relation
to the completion of QOF (McDonald, Harrison, Checkland,Table 1
Possible sources of constraint introduced by QOF on different dimensions of professiona
Dimensions Manifestation in QOF Details and impli
Bureaucratic  Proliferation of new written rules and the
formalisation of work due to necessity to
record QOF tasks via standardised ICT
‘pop-up’ QOF templates
 GP attention/w
inﬂuenced by Q
 Work is now v
privacy of cons
Social  Contract held at GP principal level and
QOF targets and remuneration
based upon whole practice performance
 Collective as
responsibility
requirements
Organizational  Contract held at practice level  Practices hav
QOF as they w
Economic  New ﬁnancial incentives equivalent
to signiﬁcant proportion (20%)
of practice income.
 QOF constitu
of practice in
Assumption t
utility maxim
maximum po
Political  Contract and QOF professionally negotiated
with state and underpinned
by professionally derived evidence.
 QOF centrally
promulgated
professional e
aligned withCampbell & Roland 2007). Thus ICT systems allow scrutiny of in-
dividual practitioner behaviour, meaning that since 2004 certain
aspects of GP work, despite being conducted within the private
consultation setting, are now ‘visible’. In addition, the composition
of these QOF teams appears to have an impact on the level of
perceived surveillance and by implication discretion of those under
surveillance. Taken together, the introduction of QOF and the
mechanisms utilised by practices to maximise their QOF scores
would therefore seemingly have implications for GPs exercising
their discretion. The only empirical study to date which assessed
the question of whether GP discretion had been affected by the
introduction of QOF however concluded that GPs did not perceive
the contract and associated changes as stiﬂing their discretion
(McDonald, Checkland & Harrison, 2009). This study however was
conducted early in the lifetime of the contract and the ﬁndings
were based on a small ethnographic study. However, changes in the
QOF (QOF is designed to evolve on an annual basis) since 2006/
7were intended to ensure that practices were required to expend
greater efforts, for no additional compensation. Some of the
changes were not perceived by GPs as evidence based (rather
politically driven interventions) and were not positively received
(Maisey et al. 2008).
Delineating and operationalising discretion
Building on Evett’s (2002) deﬁnition, we identiﬁed how the in-
troduction of QOF, might map onto each of the elements (Bureau-
cratic, Social, Organisational, Economic and Political) posited to
inﬂuence the exercise of professional discretion andwhat wemight
expect to ﬁnd as a result of its implementation (see Table 1). The aim
of the analysis is to examine the extentof empirical support for these
anticipated changes and inﬂuences on the different dimension of
professional discretion.
Methods
Semi-structured interviews with 62 GPs in a variety of locations
(33 different practices) across the north of England were conducted
over a two-year period (July 2007 and Sept 2009) by one of the
authors (SCS) as part of awider study (McDonald et al., 2010) which
received ethical approval from Leeds East NHS Research Ethicsl discretion.
cations Proposition
ork may be shaped &
OF templates
isible beyond
ultation
 Individual GP discretion in terms
of determining the focus and/or
content of previously ‘private’
consultations may be reduced.
opposed to individual
for contractual
 Increased collegial accountability
and therefore reduced individual discretion
 Possible tensions between principals
and salaried colleagues.
e freedom to implement
ish.
 Individual practice approaches may vary
as could individual GP exposure to QOF.
By implication this would affect their
ability to exercise discretion with
regards to QOF work.
tes a signiﬁcant proportion
come.
hat GPs will act as rational
isers i.e. attempt to achieve
ints.
 GP status may affect the inﬂuence of incentives
 Where incentives are aligned with
individual GP values and preferences,
there may be no implications for discretion.
derived, negotiated and
by
lites who are seemingly
the state.
 GPs discretion to not provide aspects of the
contract and/or QOF may be reduced by
perceived professional pressures to conform
to standards and services designed and
promulgated from ‘top’ down.
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was reﬂected in the longitudinal study design and resulted in ap-
proximately one third of participants (n ¼ 24) being re-interviewed
(Designated (R2)) approximately one year after the ﬁrst interview.
Participants were recruited by a combination of techniques. Snow-
ball samplingwas employed initially and recruitmentwas completed
by utilising support from the Primary Care Research Network (PCRN).
Our purposive sample comprised 41 GP principals and 21 salaried
GPs (41 GPs were interviewed from across 13 practices to allow for
intra-practice account comparisons) with just over half of all par-
ticipants (55%) beingmalewith the split between the twoGPs groups
in terms of status being: principal GPs 73%male and salaried GPs 19%
male. The average clinical experience was 14.5 years (range ¼ 0.5e
35), principal GPs had an average of 19.1 years experience in general
practice versus 5.4 years for salaried GPs. First round interviews
lasted on average for 41.72 min (range 26.09e62.81) and R2 in-
terviews average duration of 21.3 min (range 13.2e30.3). Interviews
were designed to allow participants to reﬂect on the introduction
and subsequent impact of QOF in terms of the impact for themselves,
their patients and their practices. Questions were designed to
compare and contrast pre- and post-QOF experiences and percep-
tions of general practice. Interviews took place at the individual GPs’
consultation rooms and before the interview began the participants
re-read the information sheet and consent was obtained. Interviews
were digitally recorded and professionally transcribed verbatim.
ATLAS.ti software was utilised to facilitate the data storage, man-
agement, and coding process. The analytical approach adopted fol-
lowed a framework approach (Ritchie & Spencer, 1994). The analysis
was primarily conducted by SCS who read and re-read all the tran-
scripts in accordancewith the ﬁrst stage. Each dimension as outlined
in Table 1 was used as the basis of initial indexing/coding and tran-
scripts were coded initially in accordance with this. Data linked to
these codes were placed in the relevant rows (participant ID) and
columns (e.g. economic) of a data chart. The process and completed
outcome allowed for comparisons of accounts between participants
and within themes to be made and enabled commonalities and dif-
ferences, such as between the accounts of salaried and principal re-
sponses, and cross-comparisons between participants within
practices to be readily identiﬁed. Theﬁnal stage involvedboth authors
who met regularly to discuss emerging interpretations and provide
feedback on the emerging themes and interpretations of the data.
Findings
Individual GP accounts of post-QOF life in general practice, were
replete with co-existing discursive claims of ‘no change’ and
‘change’ in individual and wider practice activities which appear to
stem from one or more of the constraining factors. Furthermore,
over time some inﬂuences were perceived to have a greater impact
than others. For ease of understanding and to allow cross-reference,
our ﬁndings are presented in line with our propositions in Table 1.
Bureaucratic: rules and standardisation?
Participants’ accounts often, at least initially, suggested that QOF
had had little personal impact on their discretion as they were
already working to ‘rules’ (e.g. other guidelines) with some sug-
gesting that the templates acted as useful ‘aide memoires’ to
facilitating their work. Consequently, the requirement to regularly
record their activities was viewed simply as the formalisation of
these existing activities:
.QOF isn’t a stress to me at all. It’s just a more formalized way
of what we were doing anyway. And we get paid for it, so bril-
liant! That’s not a hardship. (GP37 e principal)However, accounts also clearly indicated that the omnipresence
of QOF templates continued to impact on participants’ day-to-day
work. Participants viewed QOF as another competing, potentially
conﬂicting and constraining ‘agenda’ within time-limited and un-
predictable consultations:
The patient might want come in and discuss the rash on their
big toe. and actually you’ve got the hypertension review, the
blood pressure due, HbA1c due. And you’re also thinking, well,
what do I deal with? Because you’re aware that there are these
things ﬂashing. (GP16 e principal)
Although, as our proposition in Table 1 suggests, QOF could in-
ﬂuence the process and structure of the consultation, it also ap-
peared that GPs held wide discretion in whether and how to
approach QOF, as individual approaches to attending to QOF in
consultations varied. Most participants however described res-
ponding ﬂexibly in an attempt to maintain espoused preferred and/
or prior ways of consulting which they invariably described as
patient-centred. The net result of negotiating between agendas
however suggested reduced time for other valued processes and
aspects of care, consequently leading tomany perceiving their post-
QOF consultations as being less patient-centred:
[QOF] changes the concept of consultation. For instance, when I
started, I was trained to look at a patient: did I have a good con-
tact, and smile.orwhatever?but then I’mrunning late everyday
by half an hour, and then patients complain. It’s a vicious cir-
cle.So I’m ﬁnding myself more, now, turning to the computer.
So, it’s a big, big change for me. I hate it. (GP58 e salaried)
Where QOF was not able to be completed, due to complex
consultations or if GPs felt it ‘inappropriate’ to raise QOF, patients
were asked to re-attend. Participants were conﬁdent however that
these patients or QOF points would not be missed due to the call
and re-call systems:
There’s a new tier of administration in the practice who is
recalling people and basically arranging things so that we’re able
to gather the information and do the assessments that we have
to do on people. It was much more haphazard before then,
depending on what people were interested in, really. (GP50 e
principal)
Despite such perceived difﬁculties within consultations, par-
ticipants were supportive of the systematic approach to care pro-
vided by the ICT systems and viewed the overall aim of QOF as a
mechanism for improving and/or standardising quality of care
within practices:
I actually quite like the fact that we’re all e and again, we’re all
trying to do the same thing together. Thatmeans if patients go and
see [GP name] ﬁrst of all and then come to see me, they’ll get the
same treatment. rather thanusall trying to approach things from
different angles and doingour own sort of thing. (GP61e salaried)
Furthermore, the importance of following rules or following
evidence-based medicine (EBM) was replete throughout accounts
and participants commonly perceived QOF to be largely evidence-
based. The following quote typiﬁed participants’ views, reﬂecting
how EBM had become viewed as the normative way of practising
medicine:
I think some of us are really awkward about not being told what
to do. And the reality is medicine has changed. And you cannot
justify not following something where there’s not an evidence
base for it. (GP23 e principal)
Finally, although participants were supportive of QOF due to it
being largely evidence-based, theywere keen to point out that such
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that there was a continued need to interpret them for each indi-
vidual patient:
But it’s not rigid. Of course sometimes in certain cases, you come
away from it. Or sometimes, QOF has a very clear goal, for
example, in blood pressures, but if you’ve got a little old lady
who’s going to keel over if you bring her blood pressure down
even more, then you’re just going to be satisﬁed with what
we’ve got. (GP53 e salaried)
In summary, although QOF could be perceived by some as
having a minimal impact on discretion, it was clear that in com-
parison to pre-QOF, the processes and nature of consultations were
perceived to have changed, resulting in less time for certain aspects
of care. In contrast to our proposition however, GPs still perceived
that they still held wide ‘task discretion’ within their consultations.Social: impact on working relationships?
While participants still viewed the conduct during consultations
as a private and individual encounter, they were also acutely aware
that the ICT meant some of the content was now visible and
importantly, that this content contributed to the larger organisa-
tional goals and enterprise of meeting annual QOF targets.
Although partnerships have traditionally functioned on the basis of
collective responsibility, the move towards a practice-based con-
tract was seen as fundamental shift, particularly in an environment
of increasingly mixed economies where salaried colleagues and
other ancillary staff form an ever growing component of practice
staff. Many interpreted this move as a source of reduced individual
discretion:
It’s made us work more together as a practice. Prior to that, the
way we operated we had more individualistic lists, whereas
that’s gone now.We all see each other’s patients.I think it’s just
made us generally operate much more as a team, because the
entity that has to jump through all the hoops is the practice,
.we were operating much more individually before. (GP50 e
principal)
Doctors now can’t hide and do their thing.Everybody is
accountable to everybody else. The audit trails show that. you
can contract back to see who has not done what. So, there is less
room to hide.They shine up because it is ICT based as
well.(GP15 e principal)
The above would suggest that our second proposition is largely
accurate; however some unexpected inﬂuences were at play as a
minority spoke of being less regularly engaged in QOF activity than
their colleagues. In the case of GP principals, this appeared to be
tolerated due to the nature of partnerships as this GP relates:
We have QOF meetings.and everyone is asked to do what they
can. And [it’s] pointed out what was short.[but] People pull
their weight in different ways. They’re liable to be doing
something else when they’re not doing that thing. Otherwise all
partnerships would split up. It’s put partnerships under a lot
more pressure, that sort of idea. (GP14 e principal)
Salaried GPs were often viewed by their principal counterparts
as less engaged in QOF activity and this view was supported by a
small proportion of salaried GPs who viewed the overall re-
sponsibility of meeting QOF targets as that of their other ‘mana-
gerially focused’ colleagues:
This is one of the beneﬁts of being in that under-tier of a salaried
GP. It’s the partner’s job to sit all worrying. and say can youplease keep an eye upon blah, blah, blah when they are coming
in. It’s something that doesn’t have to make any difference to
me. (GP49 e salaried)
Most salaried GPs however spoke of regularly meeting their
targets for a variety of reasons. The two main reasons cited, in
addition to the evidence-based nature of the majority of targets,
were that; most eventually wished to become a partner in their
practice and many had trained in their current practices, becoming
socialized into their practice’s way of doing things, including
meeting ‘their share‘ of QOF targets:
I do my share of the game. I tend to. I trained here, so I’ve got a
lot of attachment to this practice. And I tend to do things just like
a partner. (GP59 e salaried)
The ﬁndings suggest that QOF impacted on relationships
within practices by placing a focus on the need for collective effort
towards a collective organisational target. Furthermore, the
interpretation of this new way of working as a reduction in indi-
vidual discretion would appear to support the proposition out-
lined in Table 1.Organisational: multiple approaches to implementation?
Participants frequently described how prior to 2004 they had
conducted analyses of their existing way of organising chronic
disease management (CDM) in relation to meeting the QOF targets.
This resulted in various other organisational changes such as CDM
work being re-distributed between/within clinical tiers (e.g.
increased sub-specialisation) and/or staff complements were
adjusted to cope with new/extra QOF-related work resulting in
extended hierarchies:
Because the workload had increased particularly monitoring-
wise.we needed to do an awful lot more monitoring of the
routine measures. So the combination of that, plus the fact that
our nurse had done the diabetes course and asthma course and a
prescribing course, we felt that she could move on to something
a bit more senior and someone else [the new Health Care As-
sistant (HCA)] could do the routine blood pressures and bloods.
(GP9-principal)
In many cases, as the quote above alludes to, the changes
appeared to result in lower tiers (PNs and HCAs) being allocated
responsibility for major areas of routine QOF work. All participants
spoke of internal QOF teams/leads whose remit was to actively
pursue targets, monitor and direct other clinicians to ensure overall
practice performance was raised and/or maintained:
we have got a main partner, he looks at all [the] QOF stuff for
both surgeries, and like myself and the nurse practitioner here
keep an eye on it here too.[main partner] . will let us know
basically, whatever we are falling behind in, and what perhaps
we need to look at.generally, the guidance comes from higher
up, and it just gets ﬁltered down.and then we will implement
that and do what we can. (GP48 e salaried)
In addition, this new stratum often contained a lead GP who
held overall responsibility for creating and adapting templates as
QOF evolved, ultimately ‘shaping’ and directing the work of those
around them. QOF leads however did speak of the difﬁculties
involved in ‘chasing’ clinicians in relation to particular controversial
indicators:
It’s [difﬁcult] getting people to do things because they’re not
terribly much in agreement with in terms of evidence based
medicine. (GP22 e principal)
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leads performed regular monitoring, most frequently, at weekly
practice meetings. A variety of approaches were described such as
‘naming and shaming’ to motivate activity and improve perfor-
mance. Ultimately, it appeared that many ‘non-chasers’ were
willing to accept scrutiny by QOF leads, and even the shame of
being ‘publicly’ chastised to avoid the future possibility of being
seen as the deviant case or ‘outsider’ within their organisations:
it’s almost like if you see your name there you think, oh! no I
need to go and sort that out. You know I don’t want to be the one
that’s gote you know stopping it happening you know, the case
you think oh gosh that’s my patient I’ll have to look and see
what’s going on. (GP18R2 e principal)
Finally, it appeared that in a small number of cases, particularly
for relatively inexperienced salaried participants in training prac-
tices, monitoring was a daily occurrence. While such close scrutiny
could have been seen as negative and constraining, they perceived
this as being positive both for their own continuing development
and for patient care.
very often the principal doctors at some point will go through
everybody that’s been seen that day to see if there are any points
left undone. And that’s partially because of the teaching role
being so big here. Because it is part of good care. It should have
been in their own diary of notes anyway, that something needs
updating. And so you do get pulled up if you miss some of the
things. (GP53 e salaried)
While the ﬁndings here suggest support for the proposition that
individual QOF exposure and practice approaches varied, one
common and novel feature emerged which held strong implica-
tions for discretion. Practices appeared to have undergone a form of
convergent evolution, or isomorphism, as all had developed QOF
teams whose primary purpose was the routine monitoring and
surveillance of their colleagues’ QOF-related work. This new
managerial stratum actively worked to align their colleagues’
clinical activities to the wider organisational goals. This was made
possible by the bureaucratic requirement to record QOF data and is
a signiﬁcant departure from pre-QOF ways of working, and illus-
trates reduced discretion for those subject to scrutiny.Economic: money talks?
One common view was that the changes to the contract and
QOF were a timely and much needed change, which rewarded
their profession and recognized the pressures associated with
modern general practice. While some regarded the extra QOF
earnings as a deserved pay rise, many GP principals reported
investing initial QOF monies into their practices by making the
types of organizational changes described above. Subsequent
changes to the contract however meant that the issue of ﬁnance
became an increasingly key issue in participants’ beliefs about QOF
and their adherence to QOF. As the owners of their organizations,
economic factors were more salient and apparent in principals’
accounts. Furthermore, R2 interviews indicated that economic
pressures were increasing over time. They described how extra
investment/outgoings, combined with a series of zero changes in
ﬁnancial ‘uplift,’ target thresholds being raised and a need to
maintain income levels effectively left many perceiving that there
was little room for them to disengage from any aspect of the
contract:
Some changes are slight improvements and others it feels like
sort of continue to tighten up to ﬂog a horse harder to get, you
know getting the same amount of overall practice income andyou have to work harder to get it just to maintain current
standards and you are running harder and harder to stand still.
(GP52R2 e principal)
From an average practice they took £17,500 out of the contract
and they said if you did extended hours they will give you £17,
500 back. So it’s nomoney. Yet we’re at a loss becausewe have to
pay an extra receptionist. There’s lighting, heating, electricity,
wear and tear. So we’re actually losing. But we can’t afford as a
practice to take such a big chunk of loss, £17,500 and therefore
our hands were tied and we’ve got no choice but to do it. (GP13
e principal)
The line ‘we’ve got no choice but to do it’ in terms of the
ﬁnancial implications characterized many participants’ sentiments.
Only two GPs (GP28 and GP16 from practice 12) reported that
they had collectively decided not to pursue certain areas of QOF as
they did not consider them to be ‘evidence based’ as a result they
were prepared to trade-off this portion of their income, in order to
continue to practice in a manner that was consistent with their
personal and professional values:
So if you wish to deviate from that [QOF] because of the indi-
vidual need.You have complete autonomy to, but there are
ﬁnancial implications to you because of that.. So you still have
autonomy, but you lose income. (GP28 e principal)
Salaried GP accounts suggested that economic issues were not
seen as a direct constraining factor and cast themselves as largely
removed from economic concerns which at times they viewed as
affecting their principal’s approach to patient care:
Well I think it has put a lot of strain on the partners and practice
to get all QOF points. And the same as the contract, I meanwhen
it came to get all these points just to get moremoney.and it has
lost the.normal care for patients, taking them as a patient
rather than as another points . object to get points. (GP62 e
salaried)
These ﬁndings appear to uphold the proposition that economic
factors would be perceived and act differently upon GPs of different
status, with principals ultimately having the ability to opt-out of
aspects of the contract. The vast majority of principals cited
increasing ﬁnancial pressures however as the main reason that this
did not happen and appear to be foregoing a degree of discretion, at
least in some areas, in order to make ﬁnancial gains or at least to
maintain their ﬁnancial status quo. Financial factors did not affect
salaried GP discretion directly but indirectly as their organisations
made changes and applied pressures to pursue all areas of the QOF,
irrespective of their personal views.Political: professional peer pressure?
Participants’ accounts of the contract and QOF appeared to
change over time. The initial 2004 version was deemed to have
been largely positive and beneﬁcial both to the profession and
patients. GPs spoke of how the initial version had provided a
measure of the output of general practice which had to that point
been ‘invisible’ and under-valued:
The aim of our negotiators was to make sure that we were
properly rewarded for what we were already doing. And I think
that the QOF clearly does that. And that’s why government was
so alarmed when we scored so highly because it merely
demonstrated that despite all the years of adverse publicity that
said that GPs were on the golf course all the time.they sud-
denly found out that we actually were doing rather a lot. (GP38
e principal)
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positively. While the need for evolving content was generally
accepted and perceived as legitimate if aligned to changing evi-
dence, many changes were viewed purely in political terms. The
legitimacy of the negotiators and architects of QOF was questioned:
There are guys in our job, and girls, who can’t do the job. and
really they were anoraks, and they should have done a science
degree. The worst of all is that they can’t do it, but they think
they can tell somebody else how to. (GP36 e principal)
Participants described an increasingly antagonistic relationship
between themselves, their professional negotiators and the state:
.the agreement that was reached was that those targets would
be monitored on an annual basis and would be adjusted in line
with best practice and what’s happening now is.They’re being
adjusted in line with reducing cost which completely devalues
the whole thing and eventually a point will come where the
profession will just reject it on the basis that you know, what
you’re being asked to do is dangerous and stupid. (GP41R2 e
salaried)
Despite such beliefs, a fractious point had not been reached; in
fact the vast majority of GPs were seemingly striving to meet all of
the new changes as they arose on an annual basis, irrespective of
their views on the perceived motives behind the changes. Their
motivation to do this however was seemingly based on a combi-
nation of the other factors.Discussion
The propositions about the possible inﬂuences of the different
dimensions of the QOF on professional discretion (as outlined in
Table 1) were largely supported by the ﬁndings, although some had
limited explanatory value. For example, political inﬂuences were
overestimated in that GPs increasingly appeared to view those
negotiating their contracts as distant ‘elites’ with contractual
changes increasingly seen as less aligned to frontline patient care
and evidence. In addition, while bureaucratic inﬂuences could
affect the content and nature of consultations in varied and com-
plex ways, GPs still perceived that in the majority of consultations
they still had wide ‘task discretion’ in terms of ‘if and when’ to
complete QOF tasks (template-work) within consultations. This
appeared to allow them the opportunity to maintain valuedways of
working and seemingly moderate the perceived impact of this
particular potential constraint. These ﬁndings would appear to
support evidence from those early case studies which suggested
that whilst the contract had indeed led to an ‘increase in bureau-
cratic tendencies’ there was no perceived impact on discretion
(McDonald, Checkland & Harrison, 2009).
These in-depth case studies also revealed that general practices
adopted common, organisational approaches tomeeting QOF targets
(McDonald et al. 2007). The evidence presented here would suggest
that these approaches are in fact widespread, resulting ostensibly in
a form of ‘general practice organisational isomorphism’. More
signiﬁcantly in terms of discretion, internal surveillance systems are
widespread and appear largely effective in terms of aligning indi-
vidual GP activity towards the common organisational goal of
meeting QOF targets. Members of these teams control the ICT sys-
tems and the ‘information process’ surrounding QOF and supports
the suggestion that decision-making and managerial power within
practices has become more concentrated (Huby et al. 2008). Such
changes suggest a move away from professional bureaucracies to-
wards a ‘machine bureaucracy‘ (Mintzberg et al., 1998). In such or-
ganisations, jobs are more specialised; work is more standardised,maintained and controlled by an effective and inﬂuential group of
analysts or ‘technostructure’ (in this case QOF leads). Importantly,
these changes for the most part, are perceived as legitimate and do
not appear to create resentment amongst those being monitored or
performance managed. This may be largely attributed to three main
factors. First, ‘chaser’ and ‘chased’ GPs largely shared common in-
terests as they purportedly valued and wished to practice in an EBM
manner. This is perhaps understandable since guidelines (which
ostensibly codify knowledge and reduce discretion) as part of EBM
have been part of UK general practice for many years (Checkland,
2004). As QOF was perceived to be largely evidence-based, this
represents something of a continuation or a move further along the
continuum rather than an obvious change. Furthermore, EBM ap-
pears to have become ‘naturalized’ (Fairclough,1989) linguistically in
that GPs appear to talk and think in such terms, thereby redeﬁning
medical practice. Standardised care is desired and there is now a
mechanism to reduce the likelihood of people ‘doing our own thing.’
Secondly, it was clear that as the contract was now held at the
practice level, this had led to a sense of increased accountability,
particularly horizontal, in that GPs were clear that their QOF-related
actions (or lack of) impacted upon each other. Finally, and in relation
to the other two points, it appeared that new social norms were in
play. Soft social sanctions were successfully utilised by ‘chasers’ in
order to align ‘deviant’ behaviour towards the collective organisa-
tional goal. Unlike traditional professional norms which would
prohibit overt peer criticism, GPs are seemingly willing to give and
accept performancemonitoring and criticism, at least internally. This
acceptance also appears to extend to beyond their own practices as
evidence in regards to other UK policy initiatives suggests
(McDonald, Checkland, Harrison & Coleman, 2009). Taken together,
the above suggests that it is increasingly accepted that reduced
discretion is expected and even desirable amongst GPs. It should be
noted however, that weak discretion, in the form of interpreting QOF
rules, was still in operation and may have moderated the extent to
which the impact of QOF was felt as constraining.
Economic drivers were signiﬁcant and appeared increasingly so
over-time as targets were ratcheted up. In the majority of cases, GPs
appear to be acting to maximise their chances of achieving full QOF
points, foregoing a degree of discretion, at least in some areas, in
order to make ﬁnancial gains or at least to maintain their ﬁnancial
status quo. Principals increasingly saw themselves on a ‘contractual
treadmill’ or as has been described elsewhere, have limited oppor-
tunities to resist or disengage from the contract due to their re-
sponsibility to maintain income (McDonald, 2009). Economic factors
were less of a direct inﬂuence on salaried GPs, although for those
desiring to progress onto partnership, it would appear beneﬁcial to
their chances of achieving principal status by demonstrating their
‘partnership credentials’ inmeeting their QOF targets (Cheraghi-Sohi,
McDonald, Harrison, & Sanders, 2012).
Strengths and limitations
Much of the empirical literature involves small case studies
conducted early in the life of the contract and although important,
the transferability of these ﬁndings was not well established. The
current ﬁndings add weight to the relevance and consensus of the
concepts arising from early research as many of them continue to
be identiﬁable some years on and in a larger more diverse sample
recruited via various methods to militate against the possibility of
homogeneity of participants. Furthermore, QOF is an evolving
policy and most studies provided a ‘snapshot’ of the policy and
beliefs. The longitudinal design of this study however enabled be-
liefs and experiences to be explored over time and highlighted for
example the increasing impact of ﬁnancial inﬂuences. Finally,
although the interviews provided much rich data and insight, no
S. Cheraghi-Sohi, M. Calnan / Social Science & Medicine 96 (2013) 52e59 59direct observation was undertaken and such data would have
provide a fuller picture particularly of the impact of QOF, particu-
larly on the consultation.Conclusion
The evidence as a whole suggests that via an interplay of in-
ﬂuences and in comparison to pre-QOF ways of working, a post-
QOF reduction in GP discretion was identiﬁable via GPs accounts.
This study would suggest that conducting analyses on changes to
discretion from a uni-dimensional perspective can only provide a
partial picture whereas this study’s ﬁndings, led us to different
conclusions to those adopting a uni-dimensional focus (McDonald,
Checkland & Harrison, 2009). Furthermore, the introduction of QOF
into general practice would appear to suggest the emergence of a
new form of organizational professionalism as increased mana-
gerialism, bureaucracy, standardization and assessment (Evetts,
2011) are now routine features of post-QOF general practice.
However, it should be noted that these are largely limited to QOF-
related work, which forms part of GPs activities, albeit a signiﬁcant
part. These ﬁndings seemed to support Evett’s (2011) proposition
that modern professional discretion is embedded in an organiza-
tional context and can only be understood on those terms with
individual medical freedoms and latitude being tempered by
increased collegiality, accountability and performance manage-
ment. Certainly, this collegiality was conﬁned to work between
doctors and was hierarchical with evidence of increased stratiﬁ-
cation within the general practices. This was also evident at a
broader level where political dimensions of discretion appear to be
ﬁrmly in the hands of an elite stratum of general practice. This also
conﬁrms evidence from previous empirical research carried out in
the primary care sector of English NHS, although Calnan and Gabe
(2009) have highlighted the presence of horizontal stratiﬁcation at
the micro level rather than the vertical stratiﬁcation found in this
study. Finally, debates about professional discretion tend to be
framed it in terms of constraints which are in the main coerced,
although GP narratives in this study seemed to suggest thatmany of
the changes to discretion were not only accepted and seen as good
thing but also promoted and enforced from within.
This study utilised a nuanced approach to a study of professional
discretion suggesting its value for future analyses within other
clinical and organisational contexts. Utilising the approach outlined
here should provide a mechanism to monitor and explore how
changes currently occurring in the NHS could further impact upon
medical discretion as currently one can foresee a situationwhereby
economic and political factors will become more prominent.Funding
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